



**REDUCTION OF
RADIOLOGICAL
ACCIDENT
CONSEQUENCES**

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|--------------|---|
| Title | Work performed in uncertainty quantification |
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REDUCTION OF RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
DESIGN BASIS & DESIGN EXTENSION ACCIDENTS

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Accuracy – Sensitivity - Uncertainty



A: It can be defined as *“the known bias between a code prediction and the actual transient performance of a real facility”*.

The evaluation of accuracy implies the *availability of a calculation result and of a measured value*. The experimental error is *not* part of the definition

SA: *“what-if” analysis. “The study of how the variation in the output of a model (numerical or otherwise) can be apportioned, qualitatively or quantitatively, to different sources of variation, and of how the given model depends upon the information fed into it”*.

Performed for verification purposes, for finding a) singular points, b) the factors that mostly contribute to the selected response or c) the correlation among input variables

UA: *“An analysis to estimate the uncertainties and error bounds of the quantities involved in, and the results from, the solution of a problem”*. Estimation of individual modeling or overall code uncertainties, representation uncertainties, numerical inadequacies, user effects, computer compiler effects and plant data uncertainties for the analysis of an individual event.

Nuclear safety principles and concepts like defense-in-depth require to perform UA: it must be ensured that the nominal result of a code prediction, ‘best-estimate’ in the present case, is supplemented by the uncertainty statement in such a way that connected safety margins are properly estimated.




Why Uncertainty Evaluation?

Licensing:


| Applied codes | Initial and boundary conditions | System availability | Approach | Regulation |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| Conservative code | Conservative | Conservative assumptions | Deterministic | 10 CFR § 50.46 (a)(1)(ii), Appendix K |
| Best estimate (realistic) code | Conservative | Conservative assumptions | Deterministic | Current German practice; IAEA Guide, 4.89 |
| Best estimate code + uncertainty | Realistic + uncertainty | Conservative assumptions | Deterministic | § 50.46 (a)(1)(i), Appendix A; IAEA Guide, 4.90 |
| Best estimate code + uncertainty | Realistic + uncertainty | PSA-based assumptions | Deterministic + probabilistic | |

Propagation of input uncertainty





UMAЕ & CIAU: Propagation of output uncertainty



UMAE & CIAU: Propagation of output uncertainty


THE CIAU METHOD

CIAU = **C**ode with the capability of **I**nternal **A**ssessment of **U**ncertainty


- **RELAP5** IS THE CODE
- **UMAE** IS THE COUPLED UNCERTAINTY METHODOLOGY

Any Qualified Thermal-Hydraulic System Code and Any Qualified Uncertainty Methodology can be coupled to constitute the CIAU

THE WORDS '**INTERNAL ASSESSMENT OF UNCERTAINTY**' CAME OUT AS A NEED FOR THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY DURING THE OECD/CSNI "ANNAPOLIS MEETING" ORGANISED BY US NRC AND HELD IN ANNAPOLIS (MD) IN NOVEMBER 1996



Typical result of a thermo-hydraulic system code



Typical result from a CIAU



CIAU Parameters



- Problem CIAU “stores” the uncertainty of three main parameters
 - Primary system pressure
 - Hot rod temperature
 - Primary system mass inventory
- Aim for R2CA – evaluate the uncertainty of iodine release to the environment during a DEC-A steam generator tube rupture event
- Approach – “uncertainty propagation” analogous to “error propagation”





Considered Event







- At VVER-1000 320 pressurized water reactor consider “hot header break”
- Leak equivalent to 100mm Diameter from primary system to secondary system (beyond “usual” size of Steam Generator Tube Rupture, but considered at VVER as bounding case)
- Further assumption – BRU-A valve of affected loop stuck open after first opening
- Iodine transported with Relap5-3D radionuclide transport model



- Target – uncertainty of iodine release because of TH-SYS code uncertainty
- Iodine transported with fluid – break flow will govern the release to the environment
- Over the time simulated “choked flow” phenomena present and Relap5-3D choked flow model applied
- Choked flow governed by sound speed, which in term is governed by void fraction and upstream pressure
- Upstream (SS) pressure uncertainty governed by primary pressure uncertainty, since systems are connected in the present case
- **Used Gauss error propagation law to propagate PS-Pressure Uncertainty to Iodine release uncertainty**
- **Uncertainty of void fraction at the valve from literatur**

Results CIAU and propagated uncertainty



- One contributor of uncertainty was propagated
- Other contributors might have even larger influence
- Approach of propagation not general applicable – tight to transient and domain of parameters
- However, indication of uncertainty related to the use of TH-System code could be derived!

Thank you!

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